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This study reports the results of a survey of managers of NYSE-listed firms whose stocks 
became listed on one or more of the following exchanges - London's International Stock 
Exchange (ISE), Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE), and Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). The 
results show much similarity between the motives of NYSE firms for listing on these three 
exchanges. The key motives include increasing visibility, broadening the shareholder 
base, and gaining access to financial markets. Most respondents perceive few initial 
barriers to listing on the ISE and FSE, but the situation differs on the TSE. Respondents 
saw cost and disclosure requirements as initial barriers, but they decided to list their 
firms' stock anyway. 
INTRODUCTION 
A growing number of U.S. companies have chosen to list their stock abroad in recent 
years. This growth in international listings which increasingly blurs the distinction 
between domestic and international capital markets has been fueled in part by recent 
empirical findings that equity offerings in foreign markets can increase the value of the 
firm and improve the liquidity of underlying stocks (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991; Foester 
and Karolyi, 1998). Theoretically, overseas listings should lessen the degree of market 
segmentation and cause a change in equilibrium prices for dual listed stocks. Recent 
literature on cross-listing in emerging stock markets show how a shift from market 
segmentation toward integration improves domestic market liquidity for cross-listed 
stocks (Divecha, Drack, and Stefek, 1992; Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, 1998; 
Errunza, Hogan, and Hung, 1998). 
Earlier research on the value implications of international listings focused primarily on 
the stock price effects of U.S. companies that listed their stock overseas. Howe and Kelm 
(1987) for example, report negative abnormal returns around such listings. They conclude 
that corporate managers interested in the financial well-being of their common 
shareholders should avoid foreign listings. They also note that the costs of listing 
noticeably outweigh its benefits. In a study of foreign firms that listed their stocks in the 
U.S., Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1988) find no evidence of an increase in stock 
price that should accompany a wealth-enhancing listing. In sum, these two studies do not 
show significant benefits to the share holders of firms with foreign stock listings. The 
above findings run counter to the accelerating globalization of world capital markets and 
evidence of positive effects from cross-listings reported by recent studies on emerging 
markets of Latin America and Asia. 
Managers choosing to list their stocks abroad are presumably acting in the best interests 
of their shareholders. Nonetheless, recent theoretical and empirical advances show that 
managers also pursue activities not always consistent with the goal of shareholder wealth 
maximization. For example, Howe and Kelm (1987) suggest that U.S. corporate 
managers have reasons other than increasing shareholder wealth for listing their stocks on 
international exchanges. 
Although there is no substitute for research investigations similar to those cited above, 
previous studies focusing on developed equity markets as well as recent researchers 
exploring the effects of cross-listings in emerging stock markets, have largely ignored 
one key source of information about international listing - corporate managers. No study 
to my knowledge has examined the motives of international stock listings through a 
survey of corporate executives. This paper tries to fill the void by examining why U.S. 
companies list on three foreign exchanges. Specifically, the study reports the results of a 
recent survey of managers of NYSE-listed firms whose stocks became listed on one or 
more of the following exchanges - London's International Stock Exchange (ISE), 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE), and Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). 
This paper provides insight into three questions: (1) What factors motivate NYSE firms 
to list their stock on the ISE, FSE, and TSE? (2) What initial barriers do managers of 
NYSE firms perceive to listing on the ISE, FSE, and TSE? and (3) Do the motives and 
initial barriers differ significantly for NYSE firms listing on the ISE, FSE, and TSE? 
These are only initial barriers because the firms went ahead and listed despite them. As 
an exploratory study, it neither predicts which motives or initial barries are most 
important nor which of them differ significantly among the foreign stock exchanges. 
This study is important for several reasons. First, previous researchers have not surveyed 
managers to determine the rationale for listing their firms' shares abroad. Second, the 
study complements existing research on international listing (e.g., Saudagaran, 1988). 
Although this exploratory study cannot cover all issues about international listing, it 
provides valuable information on managers' views and suggests several avenues for 
future empirical research. 
The paper has five sections. The first section discusses some potential motives for and 
initial barriers to international listing and the second section reviews pertinent literature. 
The third section describes the sample and survey questionnaire. The fourth section 
presents the empirical results while the final section ends with a summary and avenues 
for future research. 
  
MOTIVES FOR AND BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL LISTING 
Potential Motives and Benefits 
The major theoretical motive of dual listing a firm's stock on foreign capital markets 
involves segmentation and its related effects. Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan (1988) 
note that in completely segmented capital markets, investors of one country are unable to 
invest in securities of the other country and vice versa. In completely integrated capital 
markets, investors of different countries face the same opportunity set including all 
domestic and foreign securities. Mildly segmented markets cover the entire gray area 
between complete segmentation and integration. 
According to Saudagaran (1988), a segmented capital market is one in which the required 
rate of return on securities in that market differs from that on securities of comparable 
expected return and risk traded on other markets after adjusting for tax and foreign 
exchange rates. Market segmentation can result from many barriers such as transaction 
costs, information costs, government tax policies, restrictions on capital transfers, and 
language, cultural and legal barriers. 
Capital market segmentation produces incentives for firms to adopt financial policies that 
can reduce the associated negative effects. That is, segmented markets deprive investors 
of diversification opportunities, thereby raising their required expected returns and hence, 
the cost of capital. According to Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977), one way to reduce 
the adverse effects of segmented capital markets is dual listing of the firm's securities on 
foreign capital markets. 
If capital markets are completely or mildly segmented, listing on a foreign stock 
exchange should affect a firm's stock price. That is, international listing should result in 
higher prices or lower expected returns, which in turn should reduce a firm's cost of 
capital. The underlying intuition is that such listings lessen the degree of segmentation 
and therefore result in structural changes in equilibrium asset pricing relationships. In 
completely integrated capital markets, listing abroad should not have a significant effect 
on a firm's stock price. 
Several theoretical models (Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977; Alexander, Eun, and 
Janakiramanan, 1987; Errunza and Losq, 1985) provide insight into the nature of these 
changes. In practice, the issue of the segmentation-integration of international capital 
markets is controversial. Some empirical studies (e.g., Errunza and Losq, 1985, 1989; and 
Jorion and Schwartz, 1986) report a degree of segmentation but others (Bodurtha, 1989) 
find evidence consistent with integration. 
Beyond the theoretical benefit of stock price effects, there are other possible reasons for 
dual listing a firm's securities abroad (e.g., Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977; Stonehill 
and Dullum, 1982; Howe and Kelm, 1987; Saudagaran, 1988). As Table 1 shows, these 
motives fall into three broad groups - financial, political, and marketing and public/labor 
relations (Saudagaran, 1988; Biddle and Saudagaran 1991). 
  
 
 
Table 1 
Classification of Motives for U.S. Firms Seeking International Listing 
Question 
# 
in Survey 
Motives 
 Financial 
2 Improve relations with the foreign financial community 
3 Increase the demand for the firm's stock 
4 Obtain a less expensive source of funds 
5 Gain greater access to foreign money markets 
7 Improve the ability to make foreign mergers and aquisitions 
12 Help foreign investors trade the firm's stock 
13 Alter the firm's exposure to exchange rate fluctuations 
14 Increase liquidity of the firm's stock 
 Political 
1 Improve relations with the foreign government 
11 Meet local ownership requirements 
 Marketing and Public/Labor Relations 
6 Recognize the country as an important market for the firm's products or services 
8 Give a positive signal about the firm's future prospects 
10 Increase corporate visibility 
15 Improve the prospects of labor relations overseas 
Note: This classification scheme is merely suggestive, not mutually exclusive, because some motives may 
fit into more than one category. 
  
From a financial perspective, international listing can indirectly give firms a chance to 
improve their cost and availability of funds by tapping foreign money and capital 
markets. For example, foreign markets can provide a less expensive source of funds due 
to different tax structures abroad. Of course, a firm does not have to list its equity abroad 
to borrow from foreign banks, issue Eurobonds or raise money with similar instruments. 
Yet, Howe and Kelm (1987) note that having a corporation's stock listed can provide the 
company greater access to the foreign money market and make it easier to sell debt. 
International listing can provide other financial benefits. First, a firm can expand its 
potential investor base and increase the demand for its stock. This may occur because 
listing provides a convenient way for foreign nationals to get and trade a firm's stock. 
Foreign investors can trade the stock in their currency and thus save transactions costs. 
Second, foreign listing can improve a firm's ability to make foreign mergers and 
acquisitions because some countries permit only firms listed on the local exchange to 
make tender offers. Finally, an active foreign market in a firm's stock can make it easier 
to arrange stock swaps and tender offers. 
Firms may list their shares on foreign stock exchanges for political reasons. Listing 
overseas could help a firm overcome the political restrictions imposed by a host country. 
For example, foreign stock listings may reduce the risk of the imposition of capital 
controls. International listing can improve the relationship between the firm, the foreign 
government and the foreign financial community, which in turn may reduce political risk. 
If political risk is undiversifiable, such a reduction should lower the firm's cost of capital. 
Selling shares on foreign stock exchanges can help avoid nationalistic reactions to foreign 
subsidiaries that are wholly owned. Foreign listing can help a firm meet local ownership 
requirements and engender local support. 
Listing a company's stock abroad can stem from marketing and public/labor relations 
motives. For example, foreign listing can boost corporate marketing efforts by 
broadening product identification with investors and consumers in the host country. 
Therefore, listing abroad can serve as a source of visibility and name recognition. 
International listing can also be an act to recognize a country as an important market for 
the firm's products or services. The application and approval process for listing on a 
foreign exchange can provide a positive signal from management about the firm's future 
prospects. 
From a public and labor relations standpoint, international listing can increase exposure 
to investors, the government, the stock exchange, and the financial community of the host 
country. Widespread foreign ownership of stock encourages foreign shareholder, 
employee, and management loyalty and can improve the prospects of labor relations 
within foreign affiliates. For example, some firms offer stock option and stock purchase 
plans to employees in their foreign operations. Listing on the local stock exchange can 
make these plans more effective. 
Another public relations motive closely related to achieving corporate visibility and 
recognition discussed above is listing internationally for the sake of enhancing corporate 
prestige. This motive was not investigated in the questionnaire administered in the study. 
However, corporate prestige may be important especially due to the types/class of 
markets in which motives for dual listings are being examined, i.e. Frankfurt, London, 
and Tokyo. Listing stocks on these markets based in the most advanced industralized 
countries could very well enhance the prestige of the listing companies. 
  
Potential Barriers and Costs 
Firms seeking to list their stocks abroad face several potential barriers and costs (Howe 
and Kelm, 1987; Alexander, Eun, and Jankiramanan, 1988; Biddle and Saudagaran, 
1991). For instance, most stock exchanges charge fees for initial listing and continuing 
annual registration fees. Howe and Kelm (1987) estimate that the direct costs are from 
$100,000 to $300,000 per year for an overseas listing for a typical publicly traded U.S. 
firm. Besides the initial and annual listing fees, firms incur even greater costs by 
providing information to the new financial community and by following different 
accounting and disclosure standards. 
Biddle and Saudagaran (1991) report that the major accounting and regulatory costs of a 
foreign listing include: (1) adjusting accounting and auditing procedures to meet local 
requirements, (2) changing the frequency of financial reporting, (3) meeting more 
extensive foreign financial disclosures, and (4) dealing with the foreign regulatory 
agency's jurisdiction over worldwide business practices. Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) 
present evidence supporting the notion that firms are less likely to list their shares on 
foreign exchanges with more stringent reporting requirements. 
Another potential cost involves government-imposed controls on foreign exchange and 
capital. For example, foreign exchange controls in some countries make it difficult for 
citizens to invest in foreign securities. Listing abroad also can introduce an element of 
uncertainty into the future prospects of the firm. For example, regulatory uncertainty can 
be an important cost. Trading U.S. common stocks on foreign exchanges can facilitate 
manipulation of prices and use of inside information that is beyond the reach of U.S. 
regulators. 
  
RELATED RESEARCH 
There is a growing body of empirical research on international capital markets. Several 
empirical studies examine the stock price impact of international listings and the 
characteristics of firms listing abroad. For example, Howe and Kelm (1987) study the 
effect of overseas listings on stock prices. Their sample includes 165 U.S. firms that also 
listed on stock exchanges in Basel, Frankfurt, and Paris. Using standard event-time 
methodology, they investigate the impact of a firm's first, second, and third overseas 
listing. They also examine whether listings on different exchanges have different price 
effects. 
Howe and Kelm find that the first listing has the most negative abnormal returns. Their 
results also show that foreign listings have a negative value impact during the listing 
announcement period, especially for the Basel and Frankfurt exchanges. They suggest 
that firms avoid international listing because it could introduce an element of uncertainty 
into their future prospects that could cause price declines. 
McGoun (1987) analyzes the value impact of U.S. stock listing on the Tokyo, Toronto, 
and London exchanges. The evidence shows a positive response during the 30-day period 
before listing, which suggests a favorable market response to news about the listing. 
Similar to findings of domestic exchange listings, McGoun reports a negative market 
reaction in the post-listing period. 
Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan (1988) take a different perspective by examining the 
behavior of stock returns around foreign firms listing in the U.S. Specifically, they 
examine 34 foreign firms dually listing on the Amex, NYSE, or Nasdaq system between 
1969 and 1982. They hypothesize that international listing leads to a decline in the 
expected return on the firm's common stock if capital markets are either completely or 
mildly segmented beforehand. Their evidence supports this hypothesis. The cumulative 
abnormal returns during the pre-listing, listing and post-listing periods are positive, 
negative and negative, respectively. Their evidence suggests that the stock prices of the 
sample firms become part of a more integrated capital market after international listing. 
Saudagaran (1988) examines another aspect of international listing by investigating the 
association between certain firm characteristics and the likelihood of listing abroad. The 
major hypothesis is that firms are more likely to list overseas if they have high sales in 
foreign countries and have high amounts of assets and employment overseas. Using data 
on 481 multinationals, the results show significant association between the likelihood of 
listing abroad and the relative size of a firm in its domestic capital market and the ratio of 
foreign to total sales. While this study sets out to investigate motives for listing abroad, 
the empirical tests serve only to solidify the expected associations between foreign listing 
and company characteristics. 
Howe and Madura (1990) measure risk shifts in response to international stock listing in 
Germany, France, Japan, and Switzerland by U.S. firms. They find no significant shifts in 
risk from international listing, despite the risk measure examined. These findings suggest 
that listing is an ineffective mechanism for reducing segmentation because of the existing 
degree of market integration. 
Madura, Piccou and Tucker (1991) examine whether the issuance of American depository 
receipts (ADRs) affects the issuing firm's risk. They conclude that the issuance of ADRs 
generally did not influence the sensitivity of a firm's returns to its domestic market or to 
the U.S. market. 
A second group of related research addresses issues pertaining to financial markets 
liberalization and stock market development in emerging markets. Domowitz, Glen, and 
Madhavan (1998) show that market integration improves domestic market liquidity for 
cross-listed stocks. Divecha, Drach, and Stefek (1992) find significant correlations 
between individual firms in emerging stock markets than in developed markets. They 
argue that the high correlations are indicative of a lack of diversifiable risk in the 
domestic market thus magnifying the international diversification benefits of financial 
integration. 
Finally, Foerster and Karolyi (1998) argue with empirical support that listing stocks on 
foreign stock exchanges in emerging markets increases the listing firm's value and 
enhances liquidity of underlying stocks. 
  
SAMPLE AND SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Sample 
As an exploratory study, the initial sample contains only NYSE firms because, until 
recently, only large or multinational firms considered foreign stock listings (Biddle and 
Saudagaran, 1991). Such firms characterize those listed on the NYSE more than Amex 
and NASDAQ firms. The NYSE provided the names of companies listed on one or more 
of the following exchanges - Tokyo, London, and Frankfurt - and the NYSE after the 
third quarter of 1995.1 These exchanges are the three largest non-U.S. stock exchanges by 
market capitalization. Therefore, the study includes only firms on the largest U.S. equity 
market (NYSE) that also listed on the largest non-U.S. equity markets. 
The source of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the highest ranking 
financial officer of each company was The Standard & Poor's Corporate Directory. A 
telephone pilot study of 11 companies provided feedback about the preliminary 
questionnaire. The final sample excludes these firms but contains 174 other NYSE firms 
listed on one or more of the three foreign stock exchanges. In depth follow up telephone 
interviews with a random sample of six respondents helped to clarify the responses. 
  
Survey Questionnaire 
The final questionnaire has 22 closed-ended questions - 15 on motives for and 7 on initial 
barriers to international listing.2 Respondents rated the importance of each motive and 
barrier on a 5-point scale (0 = no opinion, 1 = no importance, 2 = some importance, 3 = 
moderate importance, and 4 = great importance). The questionnaire contains open-ended 
questions about the major motive for and initial barrier to listing on each exchange where 
they traded. Other questions concern the trading location (London, Frankfurt, and Tokyo) 
of their firms' stock, their position and involvement in international listing decisions. 
The survey consisted of two mailings, which took place in October and November 1995, 
respectively. The survey yielded 71 (40.8%) usable questionnaires. Of these 71 firms, 35 
(49.3%) listed on a single foreign stock exchange and the remainder had multiple foreign 
listings. In total, there are 120 listings - 55 on the ISE, 26 on the FSE, and 39 on the TSE. 
Of these 120 listings, the respondents participated in 77 (64.2%) on the TSE. Although 
the questionnaires were addressed to the highest-ranking financial officer, some were 
referred up to chief executive officers (CEOs) and some were passed along to investor 
relations. The distribution of the 57 respondents who identified their position in the 
company is as follows: 34 (59.6%) finance, 16 (28.1%) investor relations, and 7 (12.3%) 
CEOs. 
  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Motives 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the 15 motives for listing on the three exchanges 
separately and for the combined sample.3 The same motives (M2, M3, and M10) appear 
among the three most important motives for each exchange but the rankings differ 
slightly. The most highly ranked motive for listing on all three exchanges is to improve 
relations with the foreign financial community (M2). The other two most highly ranked 
motives are to increase the demand for the firm's stock (M3) and to increase corporate 
visibility or prestige (M10).4 
  
Table 2 
Importance of Motives for NYSE Firms Listing on the London, Frankfurt and 
Tokyo Stock Exchanges 
Question Motive 
London 
(n = 55) 
Mean 
London 
(n = 55)
Rank 
Frankfurt 
(n = 26) 
Mean 
Frankfurt 
(n = 26)  
Rank 
Tokyo 
(n = 
39) 
Mean 
Tokyo 
(n = 
39) 
Rank 
All  
( = 
120) 
Grand 
Mean
All  
( = 
120)
Rank
ANOVA
(df = 2) 
F-value 
M2 
Improve 
relations 
with the  
foreign 
financial 
community 
3.31 
(.81) 1 
3.00 
(.84) 1 
3.21 
(.77) 1 
3.21 
(.81) 1 1.30 
M3 
Increase the 
demand for 
the firm's 
stock 
2.89 
(.85) 2 
2.73 
(1.08) 3 
3.00 
(1.08) 3 
2.89 
(.98) 2 .59 
M10 
Increase 
corporate 
visibility 
2.70 
(.92) 3 
2.88 
(.91) 2 
3.13 
(.84) 2 
2.88 
(.97) 3 2.55 
M5 
Gain greater 
access to 
foreign 
money 
markets 
2.62 
(1.08) 4 
2.64 
(1.10) 4 
2.64 
(.99) 5 
2.61 
(1.03) 4 .08 
M12 
Help foreign 
investors 
trade the 
firm's  
stock 
2.42 
(.94) 5 
2.38 
(1.02) 6 
2.51 
(.97) 6 
2.44 
(.97) 5 .17 
M6 
Recognize 
the country 
as an 
important  
market for 
the firm's 
products or 
services 
2.24 
(1.17) 6 
2.42 
(1.24) 5 
2.69 
(1.17) 4 
2.43 
(1.19) 6 1.69 
M4 
Obtain a less 
expensive 
source of 
funds 
2.22 
(1.02) 9 
1.80 
(1.00) 7 
2.23 
(1.13) 7 
2.14 
(1.06) 7 1.60 
M8 
Give a 
positive 
signal about 
the 
firm's future 
prospects 
2.00 
(.96) 8 
1.88 
(.77) 7 
2.13 
(.95) 8 
2.02 
(.92) 8 .56 
M14 
Increase 
liquidity of 
the firm's 
stock 
1.80 
(.90) 9 
1.80 
(.97) 8 
1.95 
(1.01) 9 
1.86 
(.96) 9 .29 
M9 
Improve 
price 
stability of 
the firm's 
stock 
1.56 
(.86) 10 
1.42 
(.70) 11 
1.64 
(.84) 10 
1.56 
(.82) 10 .55 
M7 Improve the ability to 
1.49 
(.79) 11 
1.50 
(.71) 10 
1.44 
(.85) 11 
1.48 
(.79) 11 .07 
make 
foreign 
mergers and 
aquisitions 
M11 
Meet local 
ownership 
requirements 
1.24 
(.70) 12 
1.32 
(.63) 12 
1.16 
(.64) 13 
1.23 
(.66) 12 .46 
M1 
Improve 
relations 
with the 
foreign 
government 
1.02 
(.57) 15 
1.12 
(.78) 13 
1.26 
(.86) 12 
1.12 
(.72) 13 1.29 
M15 
Improve the 
prospects of 
labor 
relations 
overseas 
1.03 
(.47) 14 
1.00 
(.57) 14.5 
1.13 
(.61) 14 
1.06 
(.54) 14 .52 
M13 
Alter the 
firm's 
exposure to 
exchange 
rate 
fluctuations 
1.05 
(.40) 13 
1.00 
(.40) 14.5 
14.5 
(.43) 15 
1.03 
(.41) 15 .17 
The rating scale for a firm's motives for international listing is: 0 = no opinion, 1 = no importance, 2 = 
some importance, 3 = moderate importance, and 4 = great importance 
The standard deviation is shown in parenthesis. 
None of the ANOVA tests is statistically significant at p = .05. 
  
Other motives with consistently high rankings include gaining greater access to foreign 
money markets (M5), helping foreign investors trade the firm's stock (M12), and 
recognizing the country as an important market for the firm's products or services. Of the 
six motives ranked as most important, four represent financial motives (M2, M3, M5, and 
M12) and the other two are marketing and public relations motives (M6 and M10). 
Attaching much practical significance to the remaining motives is difficult because of 
their low mean scores. 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows no difference in the means for each motive 
among NYSE firms listing on the ISE, FSE, and TSE at p = .05. Although not shown, t-
tests between the means of the motives for each pair of exchanges provide the same 
result. 
Table 3 presents the responses to the open-ended question on the major motive for listing 
on the ISE, FSE, and TSE. Most respondents gave a motive: 49 of 55 (89.1%) on the ISE, 
22 of 26 (84.6%) on the FSE, and 37 of 39 (94.9%) on the TSE. The most common 
motive on all three exchanges is to improve visibility. Half those giving a motive for 
listing on the FSE cite visibility versus 46.9% on the ISE and 35.1% on the TSE. The 
term "visibility" includes such responses as improving name recognition, image, 
exposure, and awareness. The two other major motives are to broaden the shareholder 
base and to increase access to financial markets. Not surprisingly, these responses are 
similar to the top ranked motives shown in Table 2. 
  
Table 3 
Major Motives for NYSE Firms Listing on the London, Frankfurt and Tokyo Stock 
Exchanges Based on Responses to an Open-Ended Question 
Major Motive 
London
(n = 
49) 
Frankfurt 
(n = 22) 
Tokyo 
(n = 
37) 
Increase visibility (awareness, name recognition, or 
exposure) 46.9% 50.0% 35.1% 
Broaden shareholder base (diversity ownership) 20.4 31.8 27.0 
Increase access to financial markets 22.4 9.1 18.9 
Provide future market for products 4.1 4.5 13.5 
Other 6.2 4.5 5.4 
Totals may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
  
Telephone interviews provide additional insights about foreign listing. The interviews 
confirm the importance of several financial motives for international listing. For example, 
the respondents perceive that listing makes it easier for foreign investors to trade their 
firm's stock. In turn, the ease of trading could lead to greater demand for their stock and a 
more diversified ownership base. 
The interviews also suggest that certain motives are more important in the foreign listing 
decision than implied by theory alone. For example, several said that a major general 
motivation for listing overseas was simply to get a "market presence" by globalizing 
operations and relationships abroad. Others attached more importance to increasing 
corporate visibility than such financially oriented motives as getting less expensive funds, 
increasing liquidity, and improving stock price stability. 
The respondents note that listing on a foreign stock exchange can increase visibility in 
several ways. Firms often make presentations to members of the financial community and 
the press to familiarize them with the company and its products or services. Foreign 
listing also results in some free publicity. The increase in foreign share ownership creates 
a demand for more information about the company, which is often reported by local 
analysts and the press. 
Initial Barriers 
The survey also tries to discover the initial barriers of NYSE firms that listed on the ISE, 
FSE, and TSE and if these barriers differ among the exchanges. Table 4 displays the 
importance of various barriers to listing abroad.5 The most important barriers are 
disclosure requirements (B4), information costs (B1), and transactions costs (B2). The 
means for the barriers are usually higher on the TSE compared with the ISE and FSE.6 
The ANOVA tests show significant differences in the mean responses among the three 
exchanges on disclosure requirements and information costs. 
  
Table 4 
Importance of Initial Barriers to NYSE Firms Listing on the London, Frankfurt 
and Tokyo Stock Exchanges 
Question Motive 
London  
(n = 55)  
Mean 
London 
(n = 55)
Rank 
Frankfurt 
(n = 26) 
Mean 
Frankfurt 
(n = 26)  
Rank 
Tokyo 
(n = 
39) 
Mean 
Tokyo  
(n = 
39) 
Rank 
All  
( = 
120) 
Grand 
Mean 
All  
( = 
120)
Rank
ANOVA
(df = 2) 
F-value 
B4 Disclosure requirements 
1.81 
(.94) 1 
1.73 
(.87) 1 
2.79 
(1.09) 1 
2.11 
(.98) 1 13.53** 
B1 Information costs 
1.79 
(1.02) 2 
1.69 
(.76) 2 
2.34 
(1.12) 2 
1.95 
(1.02) 2 4.26* 
B2 Transaction costs 
1.66 
(1.02) 3 
1.42 
(.76) 3 
1.89 
(1.13) 3 
1.68 
(1.01) 3 1.72 
B3 Trading regulation 
1.36 
(.74) 4 
1.31 
(.74) 4 
1.47 
(.86) 4 
1.38 
(.78) 4 .40 
 B6 
Government 
imposed 
controls 
on capital 
1.25 
(.79) 5.5 
1.15 
(.73) 7 
1.32 
(1.04) 5 
1.25 
(.87) 5 .27 
B5 
Government 
imposed 
controls 
on foreign 
exchange 
1.25 
(.79) 5.5 
1.16 
(.75) 6 
1.24 
(.83) 7 
1.23 
(.79) 6 .12 
B7 Market manipulations 
1.20 
(.83) 7 
1.17 
(.82) 5 
1.30 
(1.00) 6 
1.22 
(.88) 7 .20 
The rating scale for a firm's motives for international listing is: 0 = no opinion, 1 = no importance, 2 = 
some importance, 3 = moderate importance, and 4 = great importance. 
The standard deviation is shown in parethesis. 
N* p = .05 ** = .01 
  
Table 5 presents the responses to the open-ended question on the barriers faced by NYSE 
firms that listed on the ISE, FSE, and TSE. Most respondents on the ISE (65.7%) and 
FSE (80.0%) perceive no major barriers. These percentages are probably understated 
because many did not answer the question. The most important barriers involve the cost 
(43.3%) and disclosure requirements (23.3%) of listing on the TSE. 
  
Table 5 
Initial Barriers to NYSE Firms Listing on the London, Frankfurt and Tokyo Stock 
Exchanges Based on Responses to an Open-Ended Question 
Initial Barrier London (n = 35) 
Frankfurt 
(n = 15) 
Tokyo 
(n = 30) 
None 64.7% 80.0% 13.3% 
Cost 22.9 0 43.3 
Disclosure and listing requirements 8.6 6.7 23.3 
Government regulations and controls 0 0 13.3 
Other 2.9 13.3 6.7 
Totals may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
  
The telephone interviews confirm that costs and administrative burdens incurred when 
listing on an overseas exchange are major considerations, primarily on the TSE. For 
example, one respondent said that the costs associated with listing and continuous 
disclosure on the TSE are "outrageous." These costs include the costs of Japanese legal 
counsel, translating corporate annual statements into the local language, meeting 
Japanese generally accepted accounting principles, filing government paperwork, 
maintaining local financial press coverage, and dealing with the complications of on-
going administration in a foreign country. 
In their analysis of whether to list, some respondents saw Tokyo as an emerging major 
money center with long-run benefits. Some did not view the supposed stringent 
disclosure requirements on the TSE as a problem. They said that large firms could 
negotiate with the exchange officials and avoid full conformity with the disclosure 
requirements. Others noted that both the Japanese government and the TSE had taken 
steps during the 1980s to reduce regulatory disclosure burdens on foreign companies. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
Before presenting the conclusions, the study's limitations warrant attention. First, the 
study has a limited scope. It examines only the major motives for NYSE firms listed on 
three non-US exchanges. Second, the study does not purport to reflect the barriers that all 
NYSE firms face in listing abroad. Instead, it focuses only on the initial barriers faced by 
the sample of NYSE firms listing on the ISE, FSE, and TSE. Third, survey research has 
potential non-response bias, but the high percent of usable responses (40.8%) somewhat 
lessens any bias. Fourth, the study surveys only one individual in each firm, but the 
decision to list abroad includes other persons. Yet, most respondents had direct 
involvement in the listing decision. Finally, the sample size is small but still represents 
120 separate listings. 
The results of the survey lead to several conclusions. First, there is much similarity 
between the motives of NYSE firms for listing on the ISE, FSE, and TSE. The key 
motives include increasing visibility, broadening the shareholder base, and gaining access 
to financial markets. Other important reasons for international listing include improving 
relations with the foreign financial community and increasing demand for the firm's 
stock. The most important reasons for listing have a financial and a market-public 
relations orientation. Second, most respondents perceive few initial barriers to listing on 
the ISE and FSE, but the situation differs on the TSE. Respondents saw cost and 
disclosure requirements as initial barriers, but they decided to list their firms' stock 
anyway. 
There are several avenues for future research. Although Tokyo, London and Frankfurt are 
the largest overseas equity markets, similar research could examine U.S. firms listing 
their stock on other developed or emerging capital markets. Another research direction is 
to investigate why foreign firms list in U.S. markets. A third avenue for research is to 
survey a sample of non-foreign-listed firms, ask whether they ever considered a foreign 
listing, and if so, why they did not proceed with it. Such research could help identify the 
barriers to international listing that managers perceive as prohibitively high. A fourth 
issue requiring study is the timing of international listings. Why do firms decide to list on 
another exchange when they do? Does listing precede offshore external financing? 
Finally, future research could examine whether such variables as size or type of business 
affect a firm's motives for international listing. These extensions may provide greater 
insight into this phenomenon and help to determine the universality of this kind of 
research. 
  
Notes 
1. Historically, there has been more trading of foreign stocks on the London exchange 
than on the others because of its reputation as a major financial market. In the latter half 
of the 1980s, Japan played a bigger role for U.S. firms seeking a foreign market for their 
stocks. The largest non-U.S. equity market based on market capitalization in 1998 is the 
TSE, followed by London's ISE and then Frankfurt. 
2. The sources for the literature review and the questions used in the survey include both 
academic- and practitioner-oriented publications. The references contain only academic 
sources. A list of articles from practitioner-oriented publications including Euromoney, 
Forbes, Fortune, Institutional Investor, The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, and 
The Wall Street Journal is available from the authors. 
3. There is a high level of consistency among the ranking of the motives. Spearman rank 
order correlations, rs, show only slight differences between each pair of exchange: rs = 
.978 between the ISE and FSE, .986 between the ISE and TSE, and .974 between the FSE 
and TSE, These correlations are significant at p = .01 using a two-tailed test. 
4. In this study the motives "Increase Visibility" and "Prestige" are synonymous. 
5. Spearman rank order correlations, rs, show a high level of association at p = .05 
between the rankings of the barriers for each pair of exchanges: rs = .936 between the ISE 
and FSE, .882 between the ISE and TSE, and .893 between the FSE and TSE. 
6. For disclosure requirements, the t-tests show that the means are significantly larger on 
the TSE versus the ISE (B4) (t = 4.56, p = .01) and the FSE (t = 4.11, p = .01). For 
information costs (B1), the means also are larger on the TSE versus the ISE (t = 2.42, p = 
.05) and the FSE (t = 2.52, p = .05). 
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